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 ABSTRACT:
 Currently, the tension between constitutio-
nalism and democracy has been directed to  criti-
ques related to supremacy of judicial review. These 
approaches indicate that the democratic fragility of 
Constitutional Courts in comparison to Parliaments 
requires more popular participation in issues invol-
ving Constitutional content and, therefore, constitu-
tional interpretation must be opened to institutional 
dialogue instead of judicial monopoly. However, for 
this dialogue to happen it is necessary the possibility 
of dissensus externalization. In the contemporary de-
mocratic theory, two main traditions analyze the role 
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of consensus and dissensus. Habermasian deliberative theory evidences 
rational consensus between subjects through a communicative action. Ne-
vertheless, the overvaluation of consensus is considered an obstacle to the 
emergence of institutional mechanisms of dissensus. Conversely, Chantal 
Mouffe’s agonism seeks to reinforce the constitutive role of dissensus in 
societies. However, her approach is limited to the presentation of an ago-
nistic principle without answering the issues related to the creation of ins-
titutional spaces. In the face of these irreconcilable approaches, this paper 
argues the possibility of a establishment of democratic decisions, which 
involves institutional dialogue, such as the proposals of the critics of ju-
dicial review, in a panorama which consensus and dissensus are in oppo-
site sides. It demonstrates that a rereading of habermasian model of the 
Democratic State of Law and the presentation of normative proposals to 
the agonistic approach put consensus and dissensus beyond a dichotomist 
and confrontational dispute perspective as they are commonly treated. In 
this sense, it presents arguments showing that an adequate interpretation 
of Habermas’ thought includes consensus in procedures and dissensus in 
content. On the other hand, it exposes that aversive conception of de-
mocracy goes beyond the deliberative model deconstruction presented by 
Mouffe and connects poststructuralist ontology with the creation of dis-
cussion’s spaces. In conclusion, these reformulations and advances inside 
deliberative and agonistic theories indicate that the role of consensus and 
dissensus in contemporary societies cannot be reduced to the dispute of 
the prevalence of one over the other. Beyond this dichotomy, it is neces-
sary to put these two essentials elements in both traditions in order to pro-
mote the dialogue between institutions to overcome the dispute among 
powers, under which they were constructed, and exert their democratic 
function. 
 RESUMO:
 Atualmente, a tensão entre constitucionalismo e democracia se 
direcionou para as críticas em relação à supremacia do judicial review. 
Tais abordagens indicam que a fragilidade democrática das Cortes Cons-
titucionais em comparação com os Parlamentos exige mais participação 
popular nas questão que envolvem o conteúdo da constituição e, por essa 
razão, a interpretação constitucional deve estar aberta para o diálogo ins-
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titucional ao invés do monopólio judicial. Demonstra-se que as reformu-
lação e avanços nas teorias deliberativas e agonistas indicam que o papel 
do consenso e do dissenso nas sociedades contemporâneas não pode ser 
reduzido a uma disputa pela prevalência de um sobre o outro. 
 RESUMEN:
 En la actualidad, la tensión entre el constitucionalismo y la demo-
cracia se dirige a la crítica de la supremacía de la revisión judicial. Estos 
enfoques indican que la fragilidad democrática de los tribunales consti-
tucionales en comparación con los Parlamentos requiere la participación 
popular en el asunto relacionado con el contenido de la Constitución y, 
por lo tanto, la interpretación constitucional debe estar abierto al diálogo 
institucional y no al monopólio judicial. Se muestra que la reformulación 
y los avances en las teorías de deliberación y agonistas indican que el papel 
de consenso y disenso en las sociedades contemporáneas no puede redu-
cirse a una disputa sobre la prevalencia de uno sobre el otro.
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I.INSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE FROM THE JUDICIAL  
REVIEWCRITICISM
The judicial review has established itself as one of the most important 
legacies from the constitutionalism of the United States. The possibility 
that each judge could analyze the compatibility between the law and the 
Constitution and set away its appliance in case of unconstitutionality has 
become a very broaden mechanism used in contemporary democracies. 
On the other hand, its success has always been followed by the dis-
trust on the democratic deficit it represents, as it would have as result 
setting aside the decisions made through the representative democratic 
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process. 
It is undeniable that the results from the judicial review practice 
around the world were important to the consolidation of rights, mostly 
to the minorities, as the protection of these groups is threatened when the 
decision making over rights is exclusively in the hands of the majorities. 
However, in a contemporary manner, the democratic requirements 
have been considerably increased. The achievement of the right to vote, as 
an example, becomes only the first step to deepen democracy even further. 
Besides that, the representative democracy gives signals of fragility 
and detachment from public will. As a consequence, the increasing on 
popular participation becomes an essential mechanism in the democratic 
life. 
In face of this scenario, the criticism towards judicial review renews 
and questions itself on how this institute may serve to protect the Cons-
titution within an environment with growing democratic demands. This 
perspective is developed by authors like Jeremy Waldron, Mark Tushnet, 
and Larry Kramer, for example. 
The first one intended to point out the democratic fragilities that 
involve the judicial review, when compared to the deliberation that oc-
curs in the parliaments. Jeremy Waldron starts in the existence of disa-
greements and the need of a decision making process that establishes a 
common opinion. In this context, he identifies that the parliament gives 
answers to this plurality of opinions in a way that respects the individuals 
by the power of influence they may have in an assembly. To the author, 
this dynamic must be valued so the debate around the judicial review does 
not remain damaged by the little attention given to the parliament dignity. 
Regarding Jeremy Waldron’s view in indicating the prominence of a 
parliament supremacy model, we shall mention that his opposition does 
not indistinctly comprise the ways of judicial participation in the consti-
tutional control of the law, as there are many practices in the world that 
are grouped under the judicial review title, and his criticisms are related to 
the United States model, which has to him a strong extent. 
Mark Tushnet (2006, p. 02) presents the differentiation between the 
weak and the strong judicial review. The first one occurs when the judi-
cial decisions around the meaning of Constitution are explicitly open to 
a legislative revision in a short term. Regarding the strong-form one, it 
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does not mean that the binding effect of judicial review to all the depart-
ments’ branches is definitive, as there is the possibility for a Constitutional 
amendment and also by the process for justices succession that may be 
chosen with the purpose of altering the previous understanding. What 
really defines this judicial review as being strong is in the constitutional 
interpretation that cannot be altered in a short term.
Lastly, Kramer is skeptical regarding the role of the Supreme Court 
in the U.S. as the unique institution able to stipulate the meaning of the 
Constitution – judicial supremacy. From a popular constitutionalism 
perspective, the author claims the primacy of popular authority to review 
the decisions taken by the Constitutional Court, as the maximum autho-
rity on constitutional law belongs to the people, and not to the Supreme 
Court. 
The important point in this critical discussion on the judicial review 
is in the highlight given to the needed equalization of the debate scale 
around the final Constitution interpreter, with a window that makes pos-
sible to other political actors to participate in the decision regarding the 
meaning of constitutional rules. 
The dialogue is the possibility for a judicial decision striking down 
a law under the Constitution to be followed by some action by the com-
petent legislative body (HOGG; BUSHELL, 1997, p. 82).  The basic idea 
around the constitutional dialogue is in promoting interactions between 
the institutions regarding the several political decisions. Such interactions 
have the latent power to overcome the limits of the dispute between de-
partments on who has the last word about the Constitution for a model 
that has the motivation for the political cooperation (GARGARELLA, 
2013, p. 15). 
The exercise of dialogue has the ability of demystifying the idea that 
judicial review is a synonym for judicial supremacy. The possibility of ve-
rifying the validity for the laws under the Constitution does not merge 
with the enforcement for the remaining departments and social actors in 
adopting the judicial interpretation as a limit to its future action. 
Lastly, the perspective of a judicial review, which is open to dialogue, 
foresees the possibility for the externalization of dissensus, because the 
dialogue does not exist at all if the constitutional interpretations cannot 
endure a reasonable disagreement. 
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However, we shall take into consideration that in the last years the 
theorist-political sphere has been dedicating a greater value to the consen-
sus, which is the result of the deliberation. Due to this fact, the discussion 
around the institutional dialogue requires the analysis of the consensus 
and dissensus role in the contemporary political decisions. 
II. DELIBERATION AND AGONISM: THE OPPOSITION BET-
WEEN CONSENSUS AND DISSENSUS
One of the main philosophical traditions that value consensus may 
be found in the conception of deliberative democracy by Jürgen Haber-
mas.
When it is confirmed that the vote is not sufficient to legitimate the 
democratic government, Habermas takes to himself a procedure that 
might rationally ground the rules for democracy. Therefore, he offers 
a discourse theory that, in its operationalization, demands the institu-
tionalization for the deliberation and decision making procedures. 
Such procedures operate as legitimate tools for the democratic pro-
cess in two ways: in the democratic will constituted in institutional 
spaces and in the informal opinion built on extra institutional spa-
ces (HABERMAS, 2011, p. 18-33). 
Besides other essential features in this model, it is possible to 
highlight the search for rational consensus between the individuals 
through the communicative path.
The consensus is inherent to political activity, as it is the 
means that make the conclusion of decisions possible. However, 
it is possible to identify that the overvaluation of consensus has 
the latent power of masking the opposing minority voices that are 
in the margin of the political community. Also, concerning the 
judicial review issue herein approached, we may affirm that dis-
sensus by institutional dialogue finds difficulties in becoming solid 
facing the idea that consensus is the final goal of political decisions. 
As a contraposition to this perspective, Chantal Mouffe reinfor-
ces the constitutive role that the antagonism has on societies, aiming 
to conciliate it with the democratic pluralism. Such antagonism has its 
basis on the legitimate existence acknowledgment of the  opponent, with 
whom it is shared the constitutive ethical-political principles of demo-
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cracy, but disagrees regarding the content of these principles.  Therefore, 
it is a conflicting consensus under the several possible interpretations for 
these principles. The legitimate opponent does not confuse itself with the 
designation of an unbeatable enemy, even less with a personal animosity, 
because we disagree with the ideas of these people, not with their right of 
defending them. 
The author understand that the impossibility in eradicating the an-
tagonism does not mean that the opponents cannot cease disagreeing, as 
the agreements are part of the political process but with the exceptional 
feature of an ongoing confrontation. Therefore, the agreements do not 
prove the extinction of conflict.  
To the author, democracy only exists as an asset when it can-
not be achieved, since the conflict and the antagonism are condi-
tions for possibility and impossibility of its fulfillment (MOUF-
FE, 1996, p. 17 and 19). The illusion of its full establishment 
keeps away the existence of a democratic contestation through 
dissensus. In the author’s perspective, the privilege to consensus 
damages democracy as it silences the dissident voices (MOUF-
FE, 2003, p. 19). Then, we cannot expect that disagreement will 
be eliminated. 
It is possible to notice that the Chantal Mouffe thinking is direc-
ted to the opposite way regarding Jürgen Habermas, as she intends to 
demonstrate that dissensus constitutes society and cannot be eradica-
ted in the name of the search for a consensus. 
Even though agonistic perspective has the potential to serve the 
statement of dialogue on judicial review between institutions, as it un-
derstands there is a higher democratic potentiality in the externali-
zation of dissensus than in the search for consensus, there is a certain 
unfinished character in the model before the announcement of agonistic 
principles, with no alternate normative proposals to the deliberative mo-
del. 
In the light of this brief view, a question remains: how is it possib-
le the establishment of democratic decisions in the judicial review that 
involve an institutional dialogue in a scenario where the consensus and 
dissensus are on opposite sides?
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 III. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE BEYOND DICHO-
TOMY 
In order to address the issue, it is intended to demonstrate that the 
rereading of the habermasian normative model of the Democratic State 
of Law, as well as the normative proposals to the agonistic model, put the 
consensus and dissensus beyond the dichotomy and the dispute for the 
preponderance of these elements. 
Regarding the consensual ambition of the habermasian Democratic 
State of Law, Marcelo Neves understands that the deliberative procedu-
res offer an intermediation of dissensus regarding moral content before 
working for the construction of consensus. “According to this rereading, 
the modernity, when facing group and individual diversity around moral 
values and contents, implies the functional and normative demand of the 
absortion of content dissensus by procedural consensus” (NEVES, 2001, 
p. 126). 
Marcelo Neves grounds his idea in the finding that the social com-
plexity of modern life makes impossible for “a rational reconstruction of 
the life-world from the communicative action in the strict sense of an 
action directed towards the intersubjective understanding. The consensus 
happens within interaction in an eventual manner” (2001, p. 128). 
In this vision, consensus is related to the continuity of intersubjective 
interactions and also regarding to disagreements. Due to this fact, it serves 
as an insurance to the expression of dissensus.
Therefore, the political and legal dissensus on values is supported by 
the consensus regarding procedures; in other words, the opening to seve-
ral different opinions and arguments with latent power to even transform 
the content of legal-political order shall be performed within the agreed/
consented rules. Consequently, only the results that may stop the conti-
nuity of the pluralist public expectation are not accepted (NEVES, 2001, 
p. 144). 
For the mentioned author, the legitimation for the Democratic State 
of Law occurs not only when the procedures systematically absorb dis-
sensus, but also while promoting its emergency state in the public sphere 
(NEVES, 2001, p. 148). 
The rereading presented by Marcelo Neves can be used to demons-
trate that it is possible for the dissensus to perform a relevant role even 
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within the perspective from the habermasian deliberative democracy. 
Therefore, the criticisms made towards the supremacy given to the con-
sensus are relativized. 
Regarding the agonistic perspective, even though it is an approach 
that aims to redeem the role of dissensus in the constitution of societies, 
it is fragile when only states the agonistic principle and does not proposes 
normative standards that replace the deliberative tradition criticized by it. 
When sharing the same poststructuralist theory tradition of Chantal 
Mouffe, Aletta Norval aims to give a normative direction to this debate by 
conciliating poststructuralist ontology with normative elements, practi-
cally absent in Chantal Mouffe and so valued in the deliberative tradition. 
The Aletta Norval proposal is called aversive democracy. The aver-
sion relates to the conformism with the contemporary democratic practi-
ces and theories. The author aims for renewing the theorist focus by com-
bing tradition and originality, with no ambition of being revolutionary. 
Its starting point is found in the relevance given to the identification 
of the democratic individual, and such identification is important to own 
constitution of this individual, as it represents a movement for claiming 
equality to be part in the decision making process (MENDONÇA, 2012, 
p. 205).
Through the discussion about exemplarity issues, democratic imagi-
nation and perfectionism, Norval enunciates a perspective that does not 
have the ideal features the democratic obligations should have for referen-
ce, but it bets on the democratic ethos as a starting point.
The normative progress from Norval regarding the agonistic princi-
ple of Mouffe can be expressed as follows: “the identification with an iden-
tity in search for equality, the contestation and displacement of existent 
structures, the possibility for inclusion through new spaces of contestation 
and discussion of real issues, and that such spaces and solutions may en-
lighten/change aspects, turning them into examples for other experiences, 
combined with the idea of perfectionism and democracy to come, trans-
form the aversive model from Norval into an interesting post-structuralist 
theoretical proposal for democracy” (MENDONÇA, 2012, p. 211). 
CONCLUSION
By this brief exhibit of the rereading from the habermasian concep-
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tion and the proposal from Aletta Norval, we may say that consensus and 
dissensus cannot be considered  irreconcilable practices, as both of them 
are forms of decision making.  
Marcelo Neves pointed out the possibility for the existence of a dis-
sensus regarding the contents of rights in the perspective of deliberative 
democracy from Habermas, and Aletta Norval considers that the post-
-structuralist tradition must give attention to the institutionalization of 
democratic agreements. 
The perspectives from these authors give margin to demonstrate that 
dissensus and consensus may not be seen through a dichotomy, in which 
there is no relation between such elements. 
In this way, the implementation of a weak judicial review, in which 
there is a possibility for an institutional dialogue, is able to coexist with 
mechanisms of consensus and dissensus. For example: a decision making 
activity directed towards the achievement of consensus inside the Court 
and, externally, institutional mechanisms that make the dissensus possible 
within the dialogue between the institutions after the decision is made. 
The overvaluation of only one of these elements weakens the latent 
power that lies when applying them together. 
Therefore, the reformulations and progresses inside both the delibe-
rative and agonist theories indicate the role of consensus and dissensus in 
contemporary societies cannot be minimized as a dispute for predomi-
nance of a model over the other. It was demonstrated that is possible to 
both elements to coexist on both traditions. This means that the statement 
of the institutional dialogue may take into consideration the relevance of 
both dissensus and consensus in its institutionalization.
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Notes
1  The antagonism is better understood when it is reformulated to agonism, which 
represents the struggle between opponents, not enemies (MOUFFE, 2005, p. 21).
